



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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6 - JUN 1961

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFF SECY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Temporary Reinforcement as a
Berlin Deterrent (S)

1. Reference is made to the memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject as above, dated 29 May 1961, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense, International Security Affairs, Comptroller, Manpower, and Installations and Logistics, were requested to provide their views and recommendations regarding the capability for, approximate costs of, and main implications of:

a. An air mobility exercise of about two battle groups to Germany in June and return within two or three weeks.

b. Movement (air, sea or both) of one STRAC division to Germany or Italy in July for one or two-month period.

c. Calling one reserve component division to active service in July for a 30 or 60-day period.

d. Other similar scale activity of ground, naval and air units which would contribute significantly to the objective of deterring the USSR from initiating a Berlin crisis.

2. Separate studies on each of the above subjects are contained in Appendices A, B, C and D hereto. In general, each of these studies concludes that the Services and the unified commands are capable of conducting the operations listed in Appendices A, B and C. Also, in regard to these three Appendices, the implications of their implementation go far beyond the pure military aspects.

3. No judgment is made in this paper as to the desirability of undertaking any measure considered herein. It is assumed the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be requested to forward their

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TOP SECRET

views on implementation and timing of any course of action proposed by higher authority. In this connection the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to emphasize that these operations, along, will not contribute significantly to the desired objective; they must be utilized in conjunction with other non-military measures, such as those contained in the Berlin "Checklist."

4. The primary implications of Appendices A and B are concerned with NATO consultations and country-to-country negotiations which would be required if these exercises were to be conducted. This would be necessary in order to obtain the utmost advantage to the United States and our Allies and at the same time deter the USSR from precipitating a crisis over Berlin.

5. The primary implication of Appendix C is the need for the President to declare an emergency within the meaning of Section 673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order reserve units or fillers for extended active duty.

6. Appendix D refers primarily to the Checklist of Possible Military and Non-Military Measures, Berlin Contingency Planning, which was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960. This Checklist provides a wide range of actions both military and non-military which are responsive to this particular problem. The Checklist is discussed extensively by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: "The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans (U)", dated 13 April 1961 and in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: "Berlin (U)", dated 28 April 1961. Included in Appendix D are examples of actions comparable to those contained in Appendices A and B. The development of costs and implications for the implementation of other checklist items could be accomplished readily when necessary. In addition, non-military measures should be considered for implementation concurrently with military measures.


7. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that this study was for planning purposes only; should not prompt any preparatory activity;

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

implementation would be a matter for decision at the highest level; and that it would be assumed that these operations would be funded above present budgetary levels.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



THOMAS D. WHITE

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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TOP SECRET

APPENDIX A

AN AIR MOBILITY EXERCISE OF ABOUT TWO BATTLE GROUPS TO GERMANY IN JUNE, AND RETURN WITHIN TWO OR THREE WEEKS, ON THE ORDER OF LONG THRUST (C)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of, and main implications of conducting a two battle group mobility exercise of two or three weeks duration in Germany during June 1961.

DISCUSSION

2. Two STRAC airborne battle groups could be deployed by air to Germany and conduct training and field exercises in major training areas. This force would have a strength of 4,216 and would require 224 aircraft sorties to airlift 3,465 short tons of personnel, equipment and supplies.

3. The estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, facilities and transportation is:

a. Army	\$ 650,000	12
b. Air Force	<u>\$12,100,000</u>	13
Total	\$12,750,000	14

4. The STRAC force is prepared to commence movement on one hour's notice. Airlift aircraft deploying to Army assembly points from airborne or ground positions can be in position for onloads at the time initial units of STRAC are prepared to move out.

5. On a "crash" basis and using only one point of departure and one point for delivery similar to planning for Exercise LONG THRUST (disregarding peacetime flight restrictions) and from "O" alert, the two battle group force could be airlifted and closed in Germany in 4.5 days. With 24 hours alert this could be reduced to three days maximum.

6. Logistical support for the deployed forces would be provided by EUCOM service components.

TOP SECRET

IMPLICATIONS

- 7. EUCOM major training area schedule would require changes. 1
- 8. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained. 2
- 9. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US
capability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in
other areas. 3 4 5
- 10. Major changes would be required in the June programmed
airlift support of DOD requirements. 6 7
- 11. Commercial air augmentation would be necessary to replace
aircraft withdrawn from scheduled MATS operations. 8 9
- 12. State Department would have to clear this exercise to
include clearance from the Federal Republic of Germany. 10 11
- 13. The North Atlantic Council should be consulted on this
exercise. 12 13

TOP SECRET

JCSM-385-61

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX B

MOVEMENT (AIR, SEA, OR BOTH) FOR ONE STRAC DIVISION TO GERMANY OR ITALY IN JULY FOR A ONE OR TWO-MONTH PERIOD (C)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of, and main implications of deploying by air, sea or both, one STRAC division to Germany in July 1961, for a 30-60 day period.

DISCUSSION

2. Deployment to Italy is not considered in this discussion because of the lack of adequate facilities, training areas, and logistics support under US control in Italy. If applied to Italy, the statistics concerning Germany are considered to be adequate for planning purposes.

3. One STRAC airborne division, could be deployed to Germany in July 1961. The division would have a strength of 11,555 and require lift for approximately 8,213 short tons of personnel, equipment and supplies. The force could be deployed by air or by a combination of air and sea as follows:

a. On a "crash" basis, assuming multiple on and off load bases with no simultaneous deployment of other forces, the division utilizing 560 aircraft sorties could be closed in Germany in nine days.

b. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, facilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days is:

(1) Army	\$ 4,000,000	21
(2) Air Force	\$ <u>30,600,000</u>	22
Total	\$ 34,600,000	23

4. To deploy two battle groups by air and the remainder of the division by sea would require 224 aircraft sorties to air lift 4,216 personnel and 3,465 short tons, and three troop transports and three cargo ships to sealift 7,339 personnel and 4,964 short tons (20,314 measurement tons).

a. The above force could close in Germany as follows:

TOP SECRET

JCSM-385-61

(1) Two airlifted battle groups: 4.5 days with zero alert and on a "crash" basis. 1
2

(2) Sealifted Division (-) 3

	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Cargo</u>	
Movement to Port and Loading Time	6 days	6 days	4
Steaming Time	<u>9 days</u>	<u>11 days</u>	5
	15 days	17 days	6

b. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, facilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days, considering air movement for two battle groups and sea movement for the division minus is: 7
8
9
10

(1) Army	\$ 4,000,000	11
(2) Navy	428,500	12
(3) Air Force	<u>12,600,000</u>	13
Total	\$17,028,500	14

5. Logistical support for the deployed forces would be provided by EUCOM service components with replenishment supplies from CONUS. If the forces were to remain in Germany indefinitely, additional logistical support units would be required. 15
16
17
18
19

6. Other possible combinations of air and sea movement of airborne or infantry divisions could be accomplished; however, they are not discussed in this paper. 20
21
22

IMPLICATIONS

7. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US capability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in other areas. 23
24
25

8. Major changes in training schedules of CONUS and EUCOM units would be required. This would have a serious effect on those units in Europe which would be displaced at the major training areas. 26
27
28
29

9. There would be a temporary reduction in lift capability to support remaining CONUS based forces which might be required to execute contingency operations. 30
31
32

10. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained. 33

11. Major changes would be required in the July programmed airlift support of Department of Defense requirements. 34
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TOP SECRET

12. Commercial air augmentation would be necessary to replace 1
aircraft withdrawn from scheduled MATS operations. 2
13. To move the division minus by sealift with less than 30 3
days advance notice would require obtaining commercial 4
transportation for scheduled passengers. 5
14. State Department would have to clear this exercise to 6
include clearance from the Federal Republic of Germany. 7
15. It would be desirable to obtain prior approval from the 8
North Atlantic Council. However, if this could not be 9
accomplished, the Council should be informed in advance. 10
16. Domestic repercussions to this exercise could be adverse 11
unless a carefully planned public affairs program were executed 12
prior to or concurrently with the exercise. 13

APPENDIX C

CALLING ONE RESERVE COMPONENT DIVISION TO ACTIVE SERVICE IN
JULY FOR A THIRTY OR SIXTY-DAY PERIOD (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the capability for, approximate costs of, 1
and main implications of calling one reserve component division 2
to active service in July for a thirty or sixty-day period. 3

DISCUSSION

2. There are 27 National Guard Divisions and 10 USAR Divi- 4
sions which are scheduled for 15 days of annual active duty for 5
training (ANACDUTRA) during the period from June through 6
September. One of those scheduled for training in July 7
could be retained on active duty for a thirty-day or a sixty- 8
day period if directed. 9

3. As these divisions are at an authorized strength which 10
is considerably below their TOE strength, they should be 11
brought up to full strength if they are to be kept on extended 12
active duty. This would permit realization of maximum training 13
and combat readiness benefits. Approximately 4,900 individual 14
fillers from the USAR mobilization reinforcement pool would be 15
required to bring the division which was investigated to full 16
strength. These are available from within the Army area con- 17
cerned. In order to effect call up of USAR fillers, Active Army 18
Corps Headquarters concerned will need a minimum of 30 days to 19
comply. 20

4. Cost for Thirty-Day Period. Overall cost would be 21
approximately \$5,142,827. This includes \$1,439,350 for 22
15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include dis- 23
placement cost for two reserve component divisions which would 24
have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated net additional cost, 25
including displacement cost, is \$3,763,477. 26

5. Cost for Sixty-Day Period. Overall cost would be 1
approximately \$9,068,305. This includes \$1,439,350. 2
for 15 days ANACDUTRA already budgeted but does not include 3
displacement cost for three reserve component divisions, 4
which would have to take ANACDUTRA elsewhere. Estimated 5
net additional cost, including displacement cost, is 6
\$7,750,955. 7

IMPLICATIONS

6. With regard to the reserve components, the President 8
(or Congress) must declare an emergency within the meaning 9
of Section 673, Title 10, US Code, before he can order 10
reserve units or fillers for extended active duty, or new 11
authorizing legislation must be enacted. 12

7. The problems of disruption of civilian occupations for 13
a 30-60 day period to include loss of pay and removal from 14
local areas for both National Guard and USAR personnel 15
concerned should be considered. 16

8. In the selection of a particular division, the following 17
factors need to be considered--strength, present training 18
status, equipment levels, training areas, equipment pool at 19
training site, morale, etc. 20

9. As a related matter, the improved readiness desired for 21
two reserve component divisions could be assisted through 22
action taken in calling reserve component divisions to duty. 23
Through the device of calling two divisions to duty, each for 24
30 days, providing necessary fillers from the USAR mobiliza- 25
tion reinforcement pool, and providing intensive training for 26
30 days, the combat readiness of these units would be greatly 27
improved. The costs, although not computed in detail, will 28
approximate twice the overall cost of calling one division 29

SECRET

for 30 days, or approximately \$10,300,000. The net cost, 1
after deducting the amount already budgeted for these 2
divisions, would be approximately \$7,500,000. 3

APPENDIX D

OTHER GROUND, NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITY WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE
TO DETERRING THE USSR FROM INITIATING A BERLIN CRISIS (S)

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the capability for, the approximate costs 1
of, and the main implications of other similar scale activity 2
of ground, naval and air units which would contribute 3
significantly to the objective of deterring the USSR from 4
initiating a Berlin crisis. 5

DISCUSSION

2. In this study it is assumed that: 6

a. The actions indicated would be of such a nature that 7
they could be executed rapidly either singly, or in 8
conjunction with the actions previously discussed. 9

b. These operations would be funded above present 10
budgetary levels. 11

3. The "Checklist of Possible Military and Non-Military 12
Measures, Berlin Contingency Planning," which was forwarded 13
to the Secretary of Defense on 12 August 1960, provides a 14
wide range of actions which are responsive to this problem. 15
In their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subject: 16
"The Status of Berlin Contingency Plans (U)," dated 13 April 17
1961, and in their memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 18
subject: "Berlin (U)," dated 28 April 1961, the Joint Chiefs 19
of Staff reiterated that the "Checklist," together with the 20
premise of accepting the risk of general war, continues to be 21
a satisfactory initial framework for the development of plans 22
for US and Free World response to any Soviet attempt to take 23
over Berlin or deny Free World access thereto. 24

4. The following points with regard to the Checklist are 25
particularly pertinent to the problem: 26

a. The "Checklist" contains 127 items divided into six 27
groups corresponding with possible developments of a 28

TOP SECRET

Berlin situation. These items in the "Checklist" are listed 1
 in an ascending order of severity but they may be implemented 2
 in any order desired. 3

b. Since the items in this "Checklist" are associated 4
 directly with the Berlin problem, their implementation as 5
 exercises could contribute significantly to deterring the USSR 6
 from initiating a Berlin crisis. 7

c. Many of the measures listed should be taken prior to 8
 or concurrent with the actions outlined in Appendices A, B, 9
 and C and the actions which will be discussed in this 10
 Appendix. 11

d. Non-military measures as well as military measures 12
 are listed and coordinated action should be undertaken on 13
 both as appropriate. 14

e. A complete discussion of the "Checklist" and current 15
 Berlin Contingency Planning is contained in the 13 April 16
 and 23 April 1961 memorandums referred to in paragraph 3 17
 above. 18

5. Since one of the primary instruments for the selection 19
 and timing of counter-reactions is the "Checklist of Military 20
 and Non-Military Measures in the Berlin Crisis," it follows 21
 that items selected from this "Checklist" are also appropriate 22
 for implementation to deter the USSR from initiating a Berlin 23
 crisis. 24

6. Two items from the "Checklist" have been selected as 25
 possible military actions which would satisfy the requirements 26
 of the problem. While they should be considered as examples 27
 only, the cost and implications of other items from the 28
 "Checklist" deemed appropriate for execution could be determined 29
 readily. It should also be emphasized that many items in the 30
 "Checklist" are not military but could have a real deterring 31
 effect on the Soviets in context with the Berlin problem. 32

TOP SECRET

Appendix D

JCSM-385-61

10

TOP SECRET

7. First Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following military forces under cover of rotation, and/or scheduled exercises.

"e. Tactical fighter force of no more than 5 squadrons to Europe."

a. Costs. In addition to 5 squadrons of F-100 aircraft, communications and electronic elements, and air base augmentation units would be required in Europe. This would require the following airlift--32 C-130 and 50 MATS aircraft. The cost for this operation based on a deployment phase of 21 days is as follows:

- (1) Per diem \$ 253,000
- (2) MATS airlift 1,825,000*
- \$2,078,000

(*Computed on basis of 100 percent dead-head of MATS aircraft. In the event MATS aircraft remain in the theater on a demurrage basis during the employment phase (21 days), total costs would increase to \$2,216,000.)

b. Implications.

(1) Prior to execution of this movement there should be consultation with NAC and nation-to-nation agreements to include overflight clearances in order that two of these squadrons could be based at Chambley, France, two at Chaumont, France, and one at Incirlik, Turkey.

(2) This force, known as TACK HAMMER, has already been earmarked for USCINCLUR in a Berlin crisis. A training exercise for this force would be most beneficial.

(3) A majority of MATS capability applied to this task would have to be replaced by commercial augmentation. Availability and costs of commercial augmentation cannot be determined at this time; consequently, these additional costs are not reflected above.

(4) Exercises scheduled by Tactical Air Command would be cancelled or rescheduled for June or July.

(5) With prior alert the first aircraft would arrive 1
 at Chambley at H plus 17:19 hours and all four squadrons 2
 would be in France at H plus 27:32 hours. The squadron 3
 for Incirlik would completely arrive by H plus 43:24 4
 hours. Without prior notice the first aircraft would 5
 land at H plus 23:16 hours and four squadrons would be 6
 in France by H plus 49:19 hours. The squadron for 7
 Incirlik would be in place by H plus 66:34 hours. 8

8. Second Item - Section C, Item 12. Move the following 9
 military forces under cover of rotation and/or scheduled 10
 exercise: 11

"b. Elements of 2nd Fleet to war stations, exercising 12
 from UK ports and in the Norwegian Sea." 13

a. Costs. If this movement were carried out during 14
 June or July when 2nd Fleet ships are assembled off the 15
 East Coast, no significant additional costs are foreseen. 16

Similarly, in August, if relieved units of the Sixth 17
 Fleet are routed to the East Coast by way of the UK and 18
 Norwegian Sea, no significant additional costs are foreseen. 19

b. Implications. 20

(1) A movement of this magnitude should be presented 21
 to the NAC prior to implementation. 22

(2) Crisis in the Caribbean may preclude the use of 23
 either of the concepts stated above. 24

(3) Country consultations with the UK and other 25
 nations would be required to effect visits by US ships 26
 to foreign ports. If carrier based aircraft are to be 27
 exercised, it may be necessary to obtain overflight 28
 rights dependent on nature of exercise. 29